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Abstract
The empirical evidence suggests that parents use inter vivos gifts (i.e.,
transfers of tangible and …nancial property) to compensate less well o¤
children whereas post mortem bequests are divided equally among sib-
lings. We study a theoretical model assuming, …rst, that the amounts
given is private information, only known to the donor and the donee,
while the amounts bequeathed is public information. Second, we as-
sume that parents care about the reputation that their bequest behav-
ior will leave them after their death. More speci…cally, this reputation
is deteriorating in the di¤erence in amounts inherited. We show that,
given these assumptions, the optimal choice of altruistic parents is
compensatory gifts and equal bequests.
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Empirical studies of intergenerational transfers show that inter vivos gifts
tend to be compensatory while post mortem bequests are equally divided
among heirs. Dunn and Phillips (1997) …nd, using US data, that gifts are
compensatory; the higher earnings of a child the smaller the received gift.
Most empirical studies of estate division …nd equal division; see Menchik
(1988) for the U.S. and Arrondel et al. (1997) for France.1 This is a puzzle
since established models of intergenerational transfers predict that there is no
di¤erence between gift and bequest behaviour. Altruistic parents will make
compensatory transfers.2
In this paper we study a model of altruistic parents adding two key fea-
tures: (1) Gifts and bequests di¤er because gift behaviour is private infor-
mation, only known to the donor and the donee, whereas bequest behavior is
public information, at least known to all heirs through the estate inventory
and possibly also even common knowledge, and (2) a social norm of equal
division of bequests. Because bequest behaviour is public information par-
ents can a¤ect their post mortem reputation. We assume that while living,
parents care about their future reputation and let this a¤ect their transfer
behavior. In this model, the utility maximizing transfer behaviour of parents
is to make compensatory gifts while dividing bequests equally.
Our assumptions about who knows what are consistent with how tax sys-
tems are designed in most industrialized countries. Only very small fractions
of total tax revenue are raised by bequest and inheritance taxes even though
the estate inventories make estate sizes common knowledge. An explanation
often given for this is that increasing bequest and inheritance taxes would
make parents shift to inter vivos gifts instead. This argument, however, as-
sumes that it is more di¢cult to tax gifts than bequests and inheritances.
This, in turn, is consistent with gifts being private information.
Laitner (1997, p. 206) writes that social norms may explain why intergen-
erational transfers are equally divided between siblings. Equal division may
curb rent-seeking behaviour of siblings competing over parental resources
and also preserves peace within family lines. Wilhelm (1996) assumes that
parents su¤ers from a …xed psychic cost if they deviate from equal division
of post mortem bequests; a hypothesis for which he …nds some empirical
support. Stark (1998), on the other hand, considers a case where a child
1Tomes (1981, 1988), however, …nds that bequests are compensatory.
2Cremer and Pestieau (1996), in a model of altrustic parents facing moral hazard and
the samaritan’s dilemma, generate the prediction that gifts are equal and bequests are
compensatory.
1becomes more deprived if she gets less than her siblings.3
In contrast our model (i) allows a trade–o¤ between the reputation e¤ect
and the altruistic parent’s compensatory ambition and (ii) makes a distinc-
tion between intergenerational transfers in the form of inter vivo gifts and
post mortem bequests.
2 Altruistic model
Consider a mother with two unequal daughters, one rich and one poor. We
study a standard altruistic model in which the mother cares equally about
the daughters. Conditional on the total bequest b, we ask how the mother
should divide the total bequest. We focus on situations where the mother




ln(ar + br) + ln(ap + bp) (1)
subject to b ¸ br+bp and where ai is the initial resources of daughter i = r;p,





r = ar ¡ ap: (2)
The opportunity cost of increasing the bequest to one daughter is the iden-
tical reduction in bequest to the other daughter, both measured in marginal
utilities of income. The mother will choose to equalise consumption op-
portunities between daughters. This means that she compensates the poor
daughter by setting bA
p > bA
r such that (2) holds. This solution, which is
illustrated as allocation ® in Figure 1, is contrary to overwhelming empirical
evidence that bequests are equally divided. Note that the solid line with
slope 1 is the locus of equal bequest whereas the dotted line with slope 1 is
the locus of equal of consumption opportunities.
3 Post mortem reputation
We take as our starting point that the bequest behaviour will a¤ect the
reputation of the mother after she has died. Suppose that the mother cares
3Stark, however, ignores that the empirical evidence suggests that gifts are compen-
satory while his model predicts that relative deprivation will make parents tend to provide
equal gifts to their daughters.











































ap + bp = ar







about this reputation in a way such that she solves
max
br;bp





subject to b ¸ br+bp, where S is a positive constant and (br¡bp)2 is the post
mortem reputation (i.e., reputation after death). For an interior solution the







1 + S(ar + b
R






= ar ¡ ap (4)
so that bR
p ¡ bR
r < ar ¡ ap. The mother now trades o¤ her wish to equalise
consumption opportunities between the daughters with her desire for post
mortem reputation. Even if the rich daughter is more advantaged than her
sister, the mother now does not want to equalise the consumption opportu-
nities between daughters. As long as S is …nite, br = bp is never optimal.
The optimal solution is illustrated as allocation ° in Figure 2.
However, indi¤erence curves have slope
dbp
dbr






1 ¡ S(ar + br)(br ¡ bp)
1 + S(ap + bp)(br ¡ bp)
; (5)




















































ap + bp = ar
ar + br = ap + bp
45±
which evaluated at allocation ® (where ap + bp = ar + br) is
dbp
dbr




1 ¡ S(ar + br)(br ¡ bp)
1 + S(ar + br)(br ¡ bp)
< ¡1 (6)
since br < bp. Also, at br = bp the slope is
dbp
dbr




















forall strictly positive bequestsbr;bp, sinceby the same rule lim(br¡bp)!0
br¡bp
br¡bp=
1. Then all weight is given to reputation. so the mother cares only about
how she divides her bequest and not at all about the welfare of her daugh-
ters. The indi¤erence curves are now straight lines with slope 1, where the
indi¤erence curve through the origin gives the highest utility. In this extreme
case, the model does not any longer provide us with a unique solution; i.e.,
any br = bp = b such that b · b solves the mother’s problem.
44 Compensatory gifts and equal bequests
In this section we add the assumption that the bequest behaviour is public
information whereas as gift behaviour is private information. Then bequests,
but not gifts, will a¤ect the reputation of the mother after she has died.









subject to b ¸ gr + br + gp + bp. For an interior solution the …rst order
conditions can be rearranged to

























r) = ¢: (10b)
Equation (10a) implies that consumption opportunities should be equalised.













r = 0; (11b)
so that gifts are used compensatory to equalise consumption opportunities
and bequests are used to equally divide the mother’s remaining wealth among
daughters. However, the mother is indi¤erent between using gifts or bequests
to choose her position on the equal consumption locus.
5 Conclusions
The empirical evidence suggests that parents use inter vivos gifts (i.e., trans-
fers of tangible and …nancial property) to compensate less well o¤ children
whereas post mortem bequests are divided equally among siblings. We study
a theoretical model assuming, …rst, that the amounts given is private infor-
mation, only known to the donor and the donee, while the amounts inher-
ited is public information. Second, we assume that parents care about the
reputation their bequest behavior will leave them after their death. More
speci…cally, this reputation is detoriating in the di¤erence in amounts inher-
ited. We show that, given these assumptions, the optimal choice of altruistic
parents is compensatory gifts and equal bequests.
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